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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3940 
 ___________ 
 
 RICHARD EVANS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT KENNETH CAMERON, in his official and individual capacity; 
JAMIE BOYLES, in his official and individual capacity; MAJOR JADLOCKI, in his 
official and individual capacity; CAPTAIN FRANCIS PIROZZOLA, in his official and 
individual capacity; UNIT MNG. DARRIN REID, in his official and individual capacity; 
COUNSELOR TONY KUKUCKA, in his official and individual capacity; OFFICER 
WOOLRIDGE, in his official and individual capacity; OFFICER CLAWSON, in his 
official and individual capacity; OFFICER HIPPO, in his official and individual capacity; 
OFFICER SWEET, in his official and individual capacity; SARGEANT JOHN DOE, in 
his official and individual capacity; OFFICER MYERS, S.C.I. Cresson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-09-cv-00017) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 16, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 22, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
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 ___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 In this civil rights action, Richard Evans, a pro se litigant, appeals from the 
District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 Shortly after 11 a.m. on June 20, 2007, Richard Evans, a state prisoner, was 
attacked by other inmates at SCI-Cresson.  The attacks occurred in essentially three 
phases.  (1) Evans was attacked in his cell by another inmate, Cooper.  At the same time, 
Evans’ cellmate was attacked by inmate Coleman.  Evans suffered nine small puncture 
wounds to his back and neck.  (2)  Evans went to the control office to report the assault.   
As Evans was identifying his attackers to Corrections Officer (“C.O.”) Woolridge, 
Cooper approached Evans and punched Evans in the face.  C.O. Woolridge restrained 
Cooper and instructed Evans to wait by a water fountain.  (3)  Next, Coleman and an 
unidentified inmate attacked Evans by repeatedly kicking him in the face.  Evans’ 
cellmate attempted to intervene and was himself attacked.  According to Evans, prison 
personnel allowed the fight to continue for 45 minutes before intervening.  In addition to 
the puncture wounds, Evans suffered a hematoma to the left eyebrow and cheek.  Evans 
was paroled on June 28, 2007, but violated that parole and returned to prison on January 
18, 2008. 
 In January 2009, Evans filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that corrections officers failed to protect him from the assaults.  He later amended the 
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complaint to add a retaliation claim against C.O. Myers, who, in a separate incident, 
allegedly “yelled at the top of his lungs” to other inmates that “Evans is a snitch.”  The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  A 
Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be granted in part.  In particular, the 
Magistrate Judge concluded that supervisory prison personnel could not be held liable in 
their individual capacities based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred claims against all the defendants in their official capacities, and that 
Evans failed to state a retaliation claim against C.O. Myers because, inter alia, Evans did 
not allege that he was deterred from pursuing his lawsuit.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended, however, that the matter proceed to discovery “[a]s far as the defendants 
on the scene” of the assault.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report 
and Recommendation.
1
 
 Following discovery, the remaining defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the Magistrate Judge recommended granting.  The Magistrate Judge 
noted that, according to time cards, three of the named defendants (Corrections Counselor 
Reid, C.O. Hippo, and C.O. Sweet) were not at SCI-Cresson at the time of the assault.  
With respect to the first two phases of the assault, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 
the remaining defendants could not be liable because they were not aware of the risk to 
                                                 
1
 Evans does not challenge the order granting the motion to dismiss in part.  
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “[i]t is well 
settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”). 
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Evans.  As to the third phase of the assault, the Magistrate Judge found that “the de 
minimis nature of the injuries Evans received suggests that it is impossible that Evans lay 
on the ground being kicked for 45 minutes.”  The District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation.  Evans appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over an 
order granting a motion for summary judgment.  Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 
217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review 
reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (amended Dec. 1, 2010). 
“We review the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered.”  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 
F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).  We can affirm the judgment of the District Court on any 
basis supported by the record.  Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs., 
318 F.3d 473, 475 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003).  
 The Eighth Amendment imposes “a duty upon prison officials to take reasonable 
measures to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”  Hamilton v. 
Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted).  To 
establish a failure-to-protect claim, inmates must demonstrate that (1) they are 
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”; and (2) the 
prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to their health and safety.  Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  “[T]he official must actually be aware of the 
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existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been 
aware.”  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001).  This Court has 
noted that “[t]he restriction on cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth 
Amendment reaches non-intervention just as readily as it reaches the more demonstrable 
brutality of those who unjustifiably and excessively employ fists, boots or clubs.”  Smith 
v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 651 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 With respect to the first two phases of the assault, we conclude that summary 
judgment was properly granted to the defendants.  Evans did not allege that the 
defendants were aware of a threat to him when he was attacked in his cell.  Indeed, 
according to the complaint and a prison incident report, the dispute between Evans and 
Cooper appeared to originate just prior to the assault.  As the Magistrate Judge noted, 
Evans did not challenge the defendants’ assertion that the history of events before the 
assault on Evans in his cell showed no history of violence or threat of violence against 
Evans. 
 There is also no evidence that the defendants were aware of an excessive risk to 
Evans’ safety prior to the second phase of the assault.  Evans alleged that he reported the 
initial assault to C.O. Woolridge.  According to Evans’ Complaint, “Officer Wooldridge 
told [me] to point out [the] attackers while there were still inmates out of their cell[s], 
creating a great risk for [me].  So I did just that thinking that Officer Woolridge would 
protect me from any further attacks.  But before I could point out Cooper, Cooper walked 
right up to [me] and punched me in the face.  Then [O]fficer [W]oolridge restrain[ed] 
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inmate [C]oper and ordered me to go stand over by the water fountain in front of the 
control center.”  This account of Cooper’s second attack is confirmed by C.O. 
Woolridge’s report that “out of the corner of my eye I saw inmate Cooper come up and 
start[] punching inmate Evans.”  In his declaration, C.O. Wooldridge stated that he 
“notice[d] a flash in [his] peripheral vision,” which was “Cooper rush[ing] towards 
Evans.”  C.O. Woolridge then “secured inmate Cooper and escorted [him] off the wing.”  
Although C.O. Wooldridge was aware that Evans had been attacked, Evans had not yet 
identified his assailant and there was no indication that Evans was still in danger.  
Immediately after Cooper punched Evans, C.O. Woolridge handcuffed Cooper and 
removed him from the area.  On this record, viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Evans, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not conclude that C.O. 
Woolridge knew of, or consciously disregarded, an excessive risk to Evans’ safety.  
 The third phase of the assault occurred when Evans was attacked by Coleman and 
another inmate.  Evans claims that the defendants “stood by watching the beating without 
intervening.”2  This Court has held “that a corrections officer’s failure to intervene in a 
                                                 
2
 Among the defendants who allegedly failed to intervene, Evans identified 
Corrections Counselor Reid, C.O. Hippo, and C.O. Sweet.  The Magistrate Judge 
properly held that these defendants “are entitled to summary judgment on the 
factual ground that there is no evidence that they were involved in the events of 
June 20, 2007.”  Time records for all three of these defendants indicate that they 
were not at SCI-Cresson at the time of the assault.  Corrections Counselor Reid 
reported for work at 2:35 p.m. on June 20, 2007.  C.O. Hippo did not work on 
June 20, 2007, as indicated in his time records and in his declaration.  According 
to a declaration and Shift Assignment Sheet, C.O. Sweet was on transport duty to 
SCI-Waymart on June 20, 2007.  Nevertheless, the record suggests that other 
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beating can be the basis of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983 if 
the corrections officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do 
so.”  Smith, 293 F.3d at 650 (involving assault by corrections officers on inmate); see 
also Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973) (involving corrections officers’ duty 
to intervene in inmate-on-inmate assault).  In rejecting Evans’ failure to protect claim 
based on this assault, the Magistrate Judge erred.  First, the Magistrate Judge improperly 
resolved in the defendants’ favor a factual dispute concerning “the length of time the . . . 
attack on Evans lasted before the situation was brought under control.”  According to the 
Magistrate Judge, “Evans’ estimate of the fracas as going on for forty-five minutes 
instead of five minutes is understandable:  events naturally seemed shorter to the 
corrections officers observing the scene and longer and more drawn out to Evans, who 
was the one being hit.”  Even viewing the length of the assault in the light most favorable 
to Evans, however, it was error to conclude that “the de minimis nature of the injuries 
Evans received suggests that it is impossible that Evans lay on the ground being kicked 
for 45 minutes.”  According to the Magistrate Judge, “[e]ven if a jury could believe that 
[the] defendants (with no apparent reason to want Evans injured only a week before 
parole) would be indifferent to a[] prolonged attack on Evans, and to the danger to 
themselves from having disorder escalate literally in front of their faces, there is no 
                                                                                                                                                             
named defendants--including Corrections Counselor Kukucka, C.O. Clawson, and 
Sergeant Miller (initially identified as a John Doe defendant)--were present during 
the assault. 
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objective evidence of injury from this . . . attack.”  Importantly, however, “the Eighth 
Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the circumstances in 
which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries.”  Smith, 293 F.3d at 648.  Indeed, “de 
minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force.”  Id. at 649.  As in Smith, 
“[a] properly instructed fact finder could, after considering all of the evidence, conclude 
that [Evans’] injuries were so minor that the defendants’ account of the incident is more 
credible than [Evans’] . . . .  However, that is an issue of fact to be resolved by the fact 
finder based upon the totality of the evidence; it is not an issue of law a court can 
decide.”  Id.  Therefore, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate on this 
disputed factual record. 
 For the reasons given, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 
proceedings.  
 
